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The Implementation of the Country of Origin 
Regulations: A Case Study 
by Patrick D. Gill* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1984 the United States Customs Service of the Treasury Department, 
under the direction of both the Committee for the Implementation of Textile 
Agreements (CIT A) and the Reagan Administration, tried to curtail an increase 
in imports of certain textile products. The products targeted were partially 
manufactured in the People's Republic of China, and then sent to Hong Kong 
for assembly and finishing, before being imported to the United States. l On 
August 3, 1984, the Customs Service accomplished this objective by publishing 
interim regulations containing new rules of origin governing the importation 
of textile products in the Federal Register. 2 In less than thirty working days, on 
* Partner. Rode & Qualey, New York, NY; B.A. 1965, Queens College of the City University of New 
York; J.D. 1968, New York University. 
1 The Customs Service acted on the authority of Executive Order No. 12,475,49 Fed. Reg. 19,955 
(1984). See Mast Industries, Inc. v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) for a discussion 
summarizing the history leading to the establishment of the interim regulations. 
249 Fed. Reg. 31,248 (1984), 19 C.F.R. § 12.130 (1985). The authority to promulgate the rules of 
origin was claimed to be § 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, amended by 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1956), in 
which Congress provided authority to the President to implement import policies with respect to 
textiles and textile products and to authorize regulations governing their importation. Pursuant to this 
Act, in 1973 at the meeting of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), the United States 
entered into the Multi-Fiber Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (MFA). Within 
and without the MFA, the President negotiated numerous bilateral restraint agreements. Country of 
origin was defined by the interim regulations in 19 C.F.R. § 12.130 (1985) as follows: 
§ 12.130 Textiles and textile products country of origin. 
(a) Country of origin. For the purpose of this section, textiles or textile products, subject to 
section 204, Agricultural Act of 1956, as amended (7 U .S.C. 1854), imported into the customs 
territory of the United States, are a product of a particular foreign territory or country or 
insular possession of the United States only if -
(I) The textiles or textile products are wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of that 
foreign territory or country or insular possession, or 
(2) In the case of an article which consists, in whole or in part, of materials which were the 
growth, product, or manufacture or were processed in another foreign territory or country, 
it has been substantially transformed by means of a substantial manufacturing or processing 
operation into a new and different article of commerce with a name, character, or use distinct 
from the article or material from which it was so transformed. 
Although this rule of origin shall determine the country of origin of textiles and textile 
products subject to section 204, Agricultural Act of 1956, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1854), the 
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September 7, 1984, these regulations became effective, which left little time for 
importers or other interested parties to comment or protest.3 The promulgation 
of the new rules effectively implemented the administration's (and domestic 
industry's) objective of slashing imports of sweaters which were assembled and 
finished in Hong Kong from components manufactured in the People's Repub-
lic of China. These changes in the rules concerning "country of origin" deter-
minations which applied to all multiple country textile manufacturing programs 
had worldwide repercussions and sent shock waves through the apparel im-
porting business community in the United States. In the case of garments made 
from components manufactured in country A and assembled in country B, 
country B was no longer considered the "country of origin" for purposes of 
customs duty, country of origin marking, and quota.4 The Customs Service 
rule does not change the "foreign article" status of textiles and textile products under Head-
note 2, Part I, Schedule 8, TSUS (19 U.S.C. 1202). 
(b) Criteria for determining country of origin-( I) General. The criteria in paragraphs (b)(2) and 
(3) of this section shall be considered in determining country of origin. These criteria are not 
exhaustive. Fewer than all, or additional, factors may be considered. However, no article or 
material shall be considered to have been substantially transformed in a particular foreign 
territory or country or insular possession of the United States by virtue of having merely 
undergone any of the following: 
(i) Simple combining or packaging operations, or 
(ii) The joining together by sewing, looping, linking or other means of attaching otherwise 
completed component parts, or 
(iii) Cutting or otherwise separating of articles from material which has previously been 
marked with cutting lines or which contains lines of demarcation, of any type, commercially 
requiring that material to be cut in a certain manner, or 
(iv) Processing, such as dyeing, printing, showerproofing, superwashing, or other finishing 
operations. 
(2) Substantial manufacturing or processing operation. To determine whether there has been a 
substantial manufacturing or processing operation, a comparison will be made between the 
article or material before the manufacturing or processing operation and the article in its 
condition after the manufacturing or processing operation with particular regard to the 
following criteria: 
(i) Material costs, 
(ii) Direct labor costs, 
(iii) Other direct processing or manufacturing costs, 
(iv) Time involved in the manufacturing or processing operation, 
(v) Complexity of the manufacturing or processing operation, 
(vi) Level or degree of skill or technology required in the manufacturing or processing 
operation, 
(vii) Physical change of the material or article at each stage in the manufacturing or 
processing operation. 
(3) New and different article. The following criteria will be used to determine whether, as a 
result of the manufacturing or processing operation, a new and different article has been 
produced: 
(i) Change in commercial designation or identity, 
(ii) Change in essential character, 
(iii) Change in commercial use. 
3 With publication on August 3,1984, and an effective date of September 7,1984, interested parties 
had less than thirty working days to comment. 
4 For a detailed explanation of the textile manufacturing process and the effect of assembly on prior 
country of origin rules see Mast Industries, Inc. v. United States, 652 F. Supp. 1531, 1534-35 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1984), afl'd, Ap. No. 87-1182 (Fed. Cir. June 25, 1987). 
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turned importing rules upside down by declaring that country A is the country 
of origin for customs purposes.s Thus, the Customs Service did not attempt to 
resolve this specific problem with China through diplomatic channels by amend-
ing the Bilateral Textile Agreement, or by passing legislation, but instead by 
submitting to pressure from the CIT A and the administration to promulgate 
non-neutral rules of origin that threatened the fifteen-billion-dollar textile im-
portation industry.6 
Neutral rules of origin to cover all imports are a necessity.7 In the long term, 
neutral rules of origin allow future administrations to achieve political and 
policy objectives. When the administration changes the rules of origin to accom-
plish short term objectives, inconsistencies result. Thus, the rules of origin 
should never be altered to further short term policy goals. An example of the 
detrimental effects caused by altering the rules of origin is the administration's 
implementation of changes to these rules in 1984. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Historically, the country of origin rules which applied to manufactured gar-
ments were based on longstanding judicial and administrative precedents. 
Where the manufacturing of the garment takes place in more than one country, 
a determination is necessary to establish the country of origin of the finished 
garment. The manufacturing of garments is usually divided into the three 
subprocesses of cut, make, and trim (CMT). The cut or cutting subprocess 
consists of cutting component elements of a garment such as sleeves, collars, 
and front and back panels, from knit or woven cloth. The make subprocess is 
the process of assembling and/or sewing together the cut components. The trim 
subprocess constitutes the final finishing of the garment, which includes such 
operations as cutting thread and excess material from the garment and adding 
embellishments to the garment. Until 1984, longstanding administrative and 
judicial precedent established the country of assembly or "make" as the country 
of origin based on the doctrine of "substantial transformation."8 Thus, the 
; See supra note 2. 
6 Imports, by the United States government's own account of cotton, wool, and man-made fiber 
textiles, amounted to just short of $15 billion in 1985. See U.S. Textile and Apparel Trade for January-
November 1986 by Quantity and Value, printed by International Agreements and Monitoring Division, 
Office of Textiles and Apparel, International Trade Administration, United States Department of 
Commerce. 
7 See Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § b, 26 Stat. 567,613 (1891) and § 304 of the Tariff Act of 1930 
for the original statutory intent of the country of origin requirement. See also Ferrostaal Metals Corp. 
v. United States, Vol. 21, No. 31 Cust. B. & Dec. 28 (slip op. 87-76 (Ct. Int'l Trade, June 26, 1987)). 
8 The doctrine of substantial transformation was developed by the courts over time. The doctrine 
was first defined in Anheuser-Busch Ass'n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908): "Manufacture 
implies a change, but every change is not a manufacture .... There must be transformation; a new 
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country where the last substantial transformation occurred was the country of 
origin. 
The domestic sweater industry and the administration believed that the ap-
plication of these established rules of origin to sweaters partially manufactured 
in China and finished in Hong Kong created an unintended loophole under 
the bilateral agreements with Hong Kong and China. China had a very modest 
quota in the critical sweater categories, particularly the wool sweater category,9 
while Hong Kong had a large quota in the sweater categories. to In response to 
the lack of parity between quotas, the following system developed. The large 
labor-intensive industry of southern China hand knit the components of the 
sweaters. Then the Chinese industry sent the components to Hong Kong. The 
textile industry in Hong Kong then assembled and finished the sweaters and 
packed them for exportation to the United States. Under the traditional rules 
of origin, this manufacturing process made Hong Kong the country of origin 
and the imported sweaters were charged against the restraint levels negotiated 
with Hong Kong. Thus, the Chinese textile industry, which was severely limited 
as to the number of sweaters it could wholly produce and export to the United 
States, was able to benefit from its ability to produce components for the Hong 
Kong textile industry. 
The domestic knit outerwear industry perceived this multicountry operation 
between China and Hong Kong as circumventing the quantitative limits on 
sweaters from China. The outraged domestic industry exerted intense political 
pressure on the administration, the Department of Commerce, and the Customs 
Service to change the rules of origin. These complaints received a favorable 
response from the Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements, 
an interdepartmental agency that interprets and administers the bilateral textile 
agreements. The CIT A attempted to pressure Customs to administer a more 
policy-oriented rule of origin, because of its frustration over the Customs Ser-
vice's neutral application of the old administrative-judicial rules of origin. The 
administration placed intense pressure on the Customs Service to enact the 
interim regulations. 
III. THE INTERIM REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE RULES OF ORIGIN FOR THE 
IMPORTATION OF TEXTILE PRODUCTS 
The Customs Service wrote the interim regulations to apply to all foreign 
products, and not with the intent that Chinese sweaters were the sole target of 
and different article must emerge, having a distinctive name, character, or use." See also National Juice 
Products Ass'n v. United States, 628 F. Supp. 978 (Cr. In!'l Trade 1986). 
9 The Bilateral Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Agreement of August 19, 1983, as 
amended, United States-People's Republic of China. See also U.S. Imports of Textile and Apparel Products 
Under the Multifiber Arrangement, 1981-84, U.S.I.T.C. Publication 1767 (October 1985). 
1() The Bilateral Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Agreement of June 23, 1982, as 
amended, United States-Hong Kong. 
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change. The interim regulations proved to be grossly overreaching. Not only 
did they make country A the new country of origin for hand-knit sweaters; 
they also covered all other textile and apparel products covered by the Multi-
Fiber Agreement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (MFA). If country 
A created a panel or component and country B assembled the panel or com-
ponent, country A was now the country of origin. The manufacturing process 
usually involved the weaving of cloth or the cutting of components in country 
A and then the assembly of the garment in country B. Although B might contain 
the most labor-intensive part of the manufacturing process, country A under 
the interim regulations was now the country of origin. 
The interim regulations also applied to knit goods cut from cloth (as opposed 
to knit-to-shape components) that were then assembled in a second country. 
Knit components cut from cloth involve a manufacturing process different from 
knitting to shape by hand either on a hand loom or with knitting needles. Under 
the interim regulations, country A is considered the country of origin for these 
types of knit products, although under the traditional rules, country B was the 
country of origin. Thus, the interim regulations made country A the country 
of origin in all cases. 
As of October 1, 1984, importers of garments manufactured in more than 
one country faced massive and unprecedented problems resulting from the 
change in the rules of origin. The regulations themselves were far from clear 
in the case involving several countries in a multicountry operation. More im-
portantly, where the result was clear but the country of origin changed for 
marking and duty purposes, importers often found themselves in an impossible 
situation. In some cases, a quota was simply not available in the country now 
determined to be the country of origin in contrast to the result under the prior 
rules. In other cases, a quota was available only at prohibitive costs resulting in 
severe economic loss. The importing industry fled to court seeking relief, but 
to no avail. ll In Mast Industries Inc. v. Regan the Court of International Trade 
found the interim regulations to be within Customs regulatory boundaries, 
describing the regulations as replacing a "virtual regulatory vacuum for country 
of origin determinations for textile quota purposes [that existed] prior to the 
enactment of these regulations."12 Importers adjusted to the new rules by ob-
taining a country A quota whenever possible. However, Customs, CIT A, and 
the importing industry began to realize the far-reaching effects of the interim 
regulations. In fact, many suppliers and importers favored the interim regula-
tions because for them it was often beneficial to have country A rather than 
country B considered the country of origin. The government finally realized 
the futility of totally revamping the country of origin rules to deal with the 
limited China sweater situation. 
11 See supra note I. 
12 Mast Industries, 596 F. Supp. at 1567. 
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IV. THE FINAL REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE RULES OF ORIGIN FOR THE 
IMPORTATION OF TEXTILE PRODUCTS 
On March 1, 1985, the Customs Service published the final regulations, T.D. 
85-38, in the Federal Register, which went into effect on April 4, 1985.13 The 
new regulations more or less reverted to the results which obtained under the 
"50 Fed. Reg. 8,710 (1985), 19 C.F.R. § 12.130 (1986): 
§ 12.130 Textiles and textile products country of origin. 
(d) Criteria for determining country of origin. The criteria in paragraphs (d)(l) and (2) of this 
section shall be considered in determining the country of origin of imported merchandise. 
These criteria are not exhaustive. One or any combination of criteria may be determinative, 
and additional factors may be considered. 
(1) A new and different article of commerce will usually result from a manufacturing or 
processing operation if there is a change in: 
(i) Commercial designation or identity, 
(ii) Fundamental character or 
(iii) Commercial use. 
(2) In determining whether merchandise has been subjected to substantial manufacturing 
or processing operations, the following will be considered: 
(i) The physical change in the material or article as a result of the manufacturing or 
processing operations in each foreign territory or country, or insular possession of the V.S. 
(ii) The time involved in the manufacturing or processing operations in each foreign 
territory or country, or insular possession of the V.S. 
(iii) The complexity of the manufacturing or processing operations in each foreign territory 
or country, or insular possession of the V.S. 
(iv) The level or degree of skill and/or technology required in the manufacturing or 
processing operations in each foreign territory or country, or insular possession of the V.S. 
(v) The value added to the article or material in each foreign territory or country, or insular 
possession of the V.S., compared to its value when imported into the V.S. 
(e) Manufacturing or processing operations. 
(1) An article or material usually will be a product of a particular foreign territory or 
country, or insular possession of the V.S., when it has undergone prior to importation into 
the V.S. in that foreign territory or country, or insular possession any of the following: 
(i) Dyeing of fabric and printing when accompanied by two or more of the following 
finishing operations: bleaching, shrinking, fulling, napping, decating, permanent stiffening, 
weighting, permanent embossing, or moireing; 
(ii) Spinning fibers into yarn; 
(iii) Weaving, knitting or otherwise forming fabric; 
(iv) Cutting of fabric into parts and the assembly of those parts into the completed article; 
or 
(v) Substantial assembly by sewing and/or tailoring of all cut pieces of apparel articles which 
have been cut from fabric in another foreign territory or country, or insular possession, into 
a completed garment (e.g. the complete assembly and tailoring of all cut pieces of suit-type 
jackets, suits, and shirts). 
(2) An article or material usually will not be considered to be a product of a particular 
foreign territory or country, or insular possession of the V.S. by virtue of merely having 
undergone any of the following: 
(i) Simple combining operations, labeling, pressing, cleaning or dry cleaning, or packaging 
operations, or any combination thereof; 
(ii) Cutting to lengtli or width and hemming or overlocking fabrics which are readily 
identifiable as being intended for a particular commercial use; 
(iii) Trimming and/or joining together by sewing, looping, linking, or other means of 
attaching otherwise completed knit-to-shape component parts produced in a single country, 
even when accompanied by other processes (e.g. washing, drying, mending, etc.) normally 
incident to the assembly process; 
(iv) One or more finishing operations on yarns, fabrics, or other textile articles, such as 
showerproofing, superwashing, bleaching, decating, fulling, shrinking, mercerizing, or similar 
operations; or 
(v) Dyeing and/or printing of fabrics or yarns. 
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traditional doctrine of substantial transformation, prior to the interim regula-
tions. I4 The final regulations considered country B the country of origin except 
for garments manufactured from panels knit to shape in country A. The final 
regulations placed importers in almost the exact same position they occupied 
prior to the enactment of the interim regulations. Merely a few months after 
promulgation of the interim regulations, importers had to contend with an 
unanticipated need to obtain a quota in a different country, in order to comply 
with the interim regulations. For a second time, importers were locked into 
contracts with foreign producers but found themselves unable to import the 
goods to the United States. 
These changes in the interim and final regulations on such short notice made 
prudent business decisions by importers impossible and interjected great un-
certainty and risk into international trade. Such a situation can be blamed on 
the politicization of the rules of origin. The rule of origin is basically a neutral 
concept. I5 It should not be subject to domestic pressure concerning foreign 
trade policy. If a change is necessary to preserve administrative policy objectives, 
then the legitimate change should come from the policy's substantive source 
and not from the manipulation of the rules of origin. The source, in this case, 
was the Bilateral Textile Agreements with China and Hong Kong, which con-
tained a loophole. It would have been a relatively simple matter to close the 
loophole by negotiating amendments to the agreements. In fact, the bilateral 
agreements with both countries now contain amendments compensating for the 
results of the rule of origin changes. I6 
V. THE COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE RULES OF ORIGIN 
The courts did not remedy the lack of procedural due process in the imple-
mentation of the interim and final regulations. 17 In Mast Industries Inc. v. Regan, 
the Court of International Trade upheld the interim regulations and the pro-
cedures used to implement those regulations by the Customs Service. IS The 
court recognized that the adverse retail cost of the interim regulations could be 
$1.6 billion or higher. The court also noted the judicial recognition of the old 
14Id. 
15 See The Impact of Rules of Origin on u.s. Imports and Exports: Report to the President on Investigation 
No. 332-192 under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, U.S.I.T.C. Publication 1695 (May 1985). 
16 See supra note 2. For the alternate approach to improving the rules of origin see Standardization 
of Rules of Origin: Report to the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives on Investigation 
No. 332-239 under Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930, U.S.I.T.C. Publication 1976 (May 1987). 
17 Mast Industries, 596 F. Supp. at 1595 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) held that interim regulation 19 C.F.R. 
§ 12.130 (1985) was an act which "clearly and directly" fell within the foreign affairs function of the 
President. Since Customs had issued the interim regulations pursuant to presidential direction they 
were exempt from prior notice and comment requirements as they are within the foreign affairs 
function of the U.S. and the foreign affairs exemption of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1947, 
amended by 5 U .S.C. § 553 (1966). See also Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U .S.c. § 60 I (1980). 
I8 See supra note l. 
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country of origin rules in Cardinal Glove v. United States but would not provide 
relief to the importing industry. 19 The court found that there is nothing in the 
Cardinal Glove case that prevents the President from exercising his authority to 
implement agreements with foreign countries by having Customs issue regula-
tions.20 The courts citing United States Cane Sugar Refiners Association v. Block and 
Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, found that since the promulgation of the 
interim regulations was in accordance with the law, the delegated authority of 
Customs from the President cannot be challenged by the judicial branch of 
government: "After it is decided that the President has congressional authority 
for this action, his motives, his reasoning, his finding of facts requiring the 
action, and his judgment are immune from judicial scrutiny."21 This sweeping 
conclusion confirmed the Customs Service's right to deny importers reasonable 
notice and opportunity for comment as otherwise required by the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act and Executive Order No. 12291.22 The end result of the doctrine 
of judicial noninterference enunciated in the Mast Industries decisions was to 
permit an unprecedented administrative assault on due process, denying suf-
ficient notice and opportunity for comment to importers of apparel who must 
adapt their business affairs on impossibly short notice or no notice at all. It now 
appears that any administrative action intended to implement textile agreements 
is insulated from judicial review no matter how arbitrary or capricious. 
Where the Mast Industries Inc. v. Regan court left off in 1984, Mast Industries 
v. United States picked up in 1987.23 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit upheld the Court of International Trade decision that Customs 
must be given deference in interpreting its own regulations unless the inter-
pretation is clearly erroneous.24 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
agreed with the Court of International Trade opinion in Mast Industries Inc. v. 
Regan that the case law that had developed the doctrine of substantial transfor-
mation prior to the promulgation of the interim and final regulations did not 
control, and concluded that this case law is "the source of evil that the regulation 
was meant to correct. "25 
The Mast Industries Inc. v. United States decision has locked importers in an 
untenable position. With the courts unwilling to strike down regulations, im-
19 Mast Industries, 596 F. Supp. at 1570; Cardinal Glove Co. v. United States, 4 C.l.T. 41, 45 n.4 (Ct. 
Int'l Trade 1982). 
20 Mast Industries, 596 F. Supp. at 1570; Cardinal Glove, 4 C.l.T. at 45 n.4. 
21 United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 683 F.2d 399, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1982). See also 
Ambassador Division of Florsheim Shoe v. United States, 748 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
22 Although the Christmas season was saved, no compromise was offered to diminish the effect on 
the winter and spring seasons. See also Executive Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
23 See supra note 4. 
24Id. 
25 Mast Industries v. United States, No. 87-1182 slip op. at 10 (Fed. Cir. June 25, 1987). 
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porters are now at the mercy of subjective, unpredictable regulatory decisions 
by the Customs Service. Regulations should be promulgated with more far-
sighted objectives and implemented with an intent to protect all interested 
parties fairly. The Customs Service should develop a less haphazard approach 
to investigating the effect of regulations before implementing these regulations. 
Executive Order No. 12291 should be followed by requiring a regulatory impact 
analysis.26 Although the government, pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 
invited public comment upon publication of the interim rules and prior to the 
final rule, this was insufficient to protect the small business entities that the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act intended to protect through public comments.27 Com-
ments should have been invited much sooner than a month prior to enactment 
of the regulations. The government should not force importers to bear the 
burden of convincing it to correct the mistakes in the interim rules while at the 
same time conforming to the interim rules. It is even more ironic that those 
who did adapt to the new rules often found themselves at a disadvantage after 
the government issued the final rules, since the final regulations in many cases 
resulted in the same country of origin determinations as would have obtained 
under the traditional rules, but different from the determinations dictated by 
the interim regulations. 
Recent decisions of the Court of International Trade bear some evidence that 
the court recognizes the necessity to protect the neutrality of rules of origin 
and to prevent the government from manipulating those rules to accomplish 
specific trade objectives on an ad hoc basis. The decisions in Ferrostaal Metals 
Corp. v. United States28 and Superior Wire, Div. of Superior Products Co. v. United 
States29 may be some indication that the Court of International Trade is retreat-
ing from the extreme hands-off policy represented in the Mast Industries deci-
sions, concerning the relationship of country of origin rules and the substantial 
transformation doctrine on the one hand, and the implementation of interna-
tional trade agreements on the other. Both cases involved the need to make 
country of origin determinations with respect to the two countries' steel man-
ufacturing operations. If the court determined that the first country, country 
A, was the country of origin, then the steel products would be subject to quotas 
under the voluntary restraint agreements (VRA) between the United States and 
the exporting country. If the court deemed country B to be the country of 
origin, then the products would not be subject to quotas because there was no 
voluntary restraint agreement with the second exporting nation. In the Ferrostaal 
case, the court rejected an attempt by the government to ignore the doctrine 
26 Executive Order No. 12.291.46 Fed. Reg. 13.193 (1981). 
27Id. 
28 Vol. 21, No. 31 Cust. B. & Dec. 28 (slip op. 87-76 (Ct. Int'I Trade. June 26.1987». 
29 No. 87-98, slip op. at 12 (Ct. Int.'1 Trade. August 21, 1987). 
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of substantial transformation or otherwise interpret the rules of origin to bring 
the products under the scope of the VRA. The court rejected the arguments 
made by the government, holding that there was no support to suggest "that 
the court depart from policy neutral rules governing substantial transformation 
in order to achieve wider import restrictions in particular cases."30 Hence, the 
court applied "the substantial transformation test ... in accordance with long 
standing precedents and rules" and held that country B was the country of 
origin.31 In the Superior Wire case, the court likewise rejected the government's 
argument that different standards in determining the country of origin should 
be employed by holding that the court "must seek a neutral standard, unaffected 
by specialized statutory purpose, to determine the country of origin."32 The 
court in reaching this holding relied on the Ferrostaal decision and Cardinal 
Glove. 33 Thus it would seem that absent some specific regulation for imple-
menting a bilateral or multilateral agreement, issued with valid statutory au-
thority, the courts may resist government attempts to modify the basic rules for 
determining country of origin in order to further specific policy objectives. In 
fact, in Ferrostaal the court found that the government entered into the VRA 
with an understanding that the basic doctrine of substantial transformation 
would still determine the country of origin of a product manufactured or 
further processed in a second country.34 Thus, as a result of the Ferrostaal and 
Superior Wire decisions, there is some hope that arbitrary and capricious deter-
minations by the Customs Service in furtherance of perceived policy objectives 
and international trade agreements will be restrained by the court when those 
decisions deviate from long-standing judicial and administrative precedent in-
volving country of origin rules and where there is no clear indication that 
different standards should apply in determining country of origin. As stated 
by the court in the Ferrostaal case, "multiple standards in these cases could 
confuse importers and provide grounds for distinguishing useful precedents."35 
If the court continues in this direction, it certainly will provide some relief from 
the type of confusion which resulted from the inconsistent short term changes 
which accompanied the promulgation of the interim and final regulations gov-
erning country of origin on textile and apparel products. 
30 Ferrostaal, supra note 7, at 32. 
3I /d. 
32 No. 87-98, slip op. at 12. 
" See 4 c.1.T. at 45 n.4. 
34 No. 87-98, slip op. at 37. 
35 /d. at 32. 
